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that changes have occurred which, 
when considered with all other rel-
evant circumstances, required that a 
change in custody be made to accom-
modate the future best interest of the 
children" Id. at 1139. The court ac-
knowledged that "[a] determination of 
custody requires an element ofpredic-
tion" and that it is "neither necessary 
nor desirable" to wait until a child is 
harmed to make a custody change. Id. 
The court also examined the rela-
tionship between a master's recom-
mendations and a chancellor's judge-
ment. In particular, the court was 
troubled by the chancellor's failure to 
exercise independent judgment after 
subjecting the master's fact-finding to 
a clearly erroneous test. The court 
called the burden on chancellors "sub-
stantial," and the court emphasized 
that while consideration may and 
should be given to a master's recom-
mendations, the final decision must be 
that of the chancellor's. Id. at 1135, 
1138. ''That the conclusions ... ofthe 
master are well supported by the evi-
dence is not dispositive ifthe indepen-
dent exercise of judgment by the chan-
cellor on those issues would produce a 
different result," explained the court. 
Id. at 1135. 
The McCready and Domingues 
opinions should provide fresh guid-
ance for change-in-custody cases. The 
decisions affirmed that the standard for 
modification of custody orders is the 
''best interests ofthe child." Addition-
ally, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
clearly stated that a child need not have 
been adversely affected before a chance 
in custody can occur. Finally, the 
court's emphasis on the chancellor's 
duty to exercise independent judgment 
forces trial judges to take procedural 
steps to avoid the appearance of rub-
ber-stamping the recommendations of 
masters. 
- Catherine E. Head 
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Murphyv. Edmonds: MARYLAND'S 
STATUTORY CAPON NONECO-
NOMIC DAMAGES IN PER-
SONAL INJURY CASES IS CON-
STITUTIONAL AND NEITHER 
VIOLATES DUE PROCESS NOR 
DENIES RIGHT TO A JURY 
TRIAL. 
In Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 
102 (Md. 1992), the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland upheld the State's statu-
tory cap on noneconomic damages in 
personal injury cases as constitutional. 
Using the least burdensome test in 
analyzing the Courts & Judicial Pro-
ceedings article, section 11-108 ofthe 
Maryland Code, the court found that 
the law was rationally related to the 
State's purpose and did not violate the 
equal protection clause of the constitu-
tion. The court's ruling also means 
that limiting a jury's award with a 
noneconomic damages cap does not 
violate an individual's constitutional 
right to a jury trial. In justifying it's 
position, the court proclaimed its def-
erence to the legislature in removing 
the issue from the judiciary and enact-
ing the cap with legislation. 
Sarah Murphy was involved in an 
automobile accident while driving on 
1-83 in Baltimore. The defendants' tire 
blew out and his truck ran across the 
median striking Ms. Murphy, causing 
her serious injuries. Ms. Murphy and 
her husband filed a complaint in Balti-
more County Circuit Court for com-
pensatory and punitive damages. The 
jury awarded the Murphys $510,000 in 
noneconomic damages. The defen-
dants filed post trial motions request-
ing that the noneconomic damages be 
reduced to the statutory amount of 
$350,000 as provided in section 11-
108. 
The plaintiffs, however, argued that 
section 11-108 violated the equal pro-
tection guarantee embodied in the Due 
Process Clause found in article 24 of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
The trial court ruled that the statute 
limited an important right, and there-
fore, the statute would have to pass the 
heightened scrutiny test. Id. at 106. 
The judge found the statute failed 
heightened scrutiny and therefore up-
held the jury award. 
The court of special appeals re-
versed the trial court's holding in 
Edmonds v. Murphy, 573 A.2d 853 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990). There, the 
court found that there was no impor-
tant right which the statute was limit-
ing and, determined that as such, sec-
tion 11-108 was rationally related to 
the State's goal of economic regula-
tion and thus constitutional. . 
The plaintiffs appealed to the court 
of appeals on two issues: 1) that the 
classification created by section Il-
108 violated the equal protection guar-
antee of article 24 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights, and 2) that sec-
tion 11-108 infringes upon the right to 
ajurytrial under articles 5and23 ofthe 
Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
The court began its analysis on the 
premise that equal protection as ad-
dressed in Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and ar-
ticle 24 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights was the same concept for ana-
lytical purposes. Opinions of the 
United States Supreme Court dealing 
with the Equal Protection Clause ofthe 
Fourteenth Amendment were there-
fore viewed by the court of appeals as 
''practically direct authorities." Id. at 
1 08 (citing Attorney General v. 
Waldron, 426 A.2d 929 (1981». 
The plaintiffs argued that section 
11-108 created two classes of people 
when damages were awarded under 
this statute. One group, composed of 
those who were less seriously injured, 
got to keep the entire jury award, while 
the other group, those who were more 
seriously injured, did not. Such classi-
fication, the plaintiffs argued, was in 
violation ofthe equal protection guar-
antee of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights. 
In addressing the plaintiffs' claim, 
the court discussed the three different 
standards of review for classifications 
chaJlenged under the equal protection 
guarantees. The least restrictive stan-
dard of review was the rational basis 
test, where it would strike down legis-
lation "only if it [was] so unrelated to 
legitimate purpose that government 
actions were irrational." Id. (quoting 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, III S. Ct. 2395, 
2406 (1991». 
Secondly, the court identified "in-
termediate scrutiny," or "heightened 
scrutiny." For this classification to be 
sustained it "must serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and must be sub-
stantially related to achievement of 
those objectives." Id. at 110 (quoting 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 
(1976». 
The court then recognized the third 
category involving cases where a "sus.., 
pect class" or a "fundamental right" 
was burdened. The court explained 
that the classification was subject to 
strict scrutiny and it would uphold 
such a law "under equal protection 
guarantee only if it [was] shown that 
'they are suitably tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest. ,,, Id. at 109 
(quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985». 
The plaintiffs argued that the inter-
mediate scrutiny test should apply be-
cause section 11-1 08 limits an "impor-
tant personal right." Id. at 111. The 
plaintiffs asserted that this personal 
right arose out of the common law 
right to be compensated for 
noneconomic damages. The court of 
appeals refused to apply the intermedi-
ate test on the basis that, in its view, the 
right to compensation under common 
law does not give rise to an "important 
personal right." The court stated, "a 
legislative cap of $350,000 upon the 
amount of noneconomic damages 
which can be awarded to a tort plaintiff 
does not implicate such an important 
'right' as to trigger any enhanced scru-
tiny." Id. 
The court based its position on ar-
ticle 5 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights, which said the common law 
was subject "to the revision of and 
amendment or repeal by the legislature 
of this state." Id. at 112. The court 
reasoned that just because a law was 
found in the common law does not 
mean that the legislature could not 
change it. Further, the court empha-
sized that iftheplaintiffs' position was 
adopted, every common law would 
become a personal right and applying 
the intermediate standard of review 
would prevent the legislature from 
making many laws. Id. 
The court pointed out that its deci-
sion followed the United States Su-
preme Court's ruling in Duke Power 
Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 
U.S. 59 (1978), where the Court ap-
plied the rational basis test to a legisla-
tive cap on tort damages in nuclear 
power accidents. In that case, the 
Court stated that the law was "'a clas-
sic example of an economic regula-
tion' needed to accommodate 'the bur-
dens and benefits of economic life, '" 
and further emphasized that '''[a] per-
son has no property, no vested interest, 
in any rule of the common law.'" Id. 
(quoting Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88). 
The court of appeals further stated 
that its holding does not limit a person's 
access to the courts, as the Murphys 
argued. The court reasoned that modi-
fying the substantive law does not re-
strict access to the courts. Even if 
section 11-108 was restrictive, the court 
explained, it would be reasonable based 
upon the legislative intent of increas-
ing the availability of insurance in 
Maryland. Id. at 113-14. 
Having decided that the rational 
basis test applied in this case, the court 
viewed the statute as constitutional. 
The court looked to the General 
Assembly's reasoning for passing the 
legislation. The court noted the 
legislature's concern about the avail-
ability and cost ofliability insurance in 
Maryland, the excessive insurance pre-
miums for doctors, and the declining 
services available for patients. The 
court noted that the stated purpose of 
the law was to "assure the availability 
of sufficient liability insurance, at a 
reasonable cost, in orderto coverclairns 
for personal injuries to members of the 
public." Id. at 115. As such, it served 
a legitimate state purpose and applied 
to all personal injury claimants equally, 
ratherthan singling out one category of 
claimants. Therefore, the court held 
that the noneconomic damages cap was 
neither irrational or arbitrary. 
The plaintiffs' second argument was 
that the cap violated their right to a jury 
trial as guaranteed by articles 5 and 23 
ofthe Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
Their rights, the plaintiffs argued, were 
violated because the cap interfered with 
the jury's ability to properly determine 
damages and also interfered ''with the 
jury's exclusive province in determin-
ing factual issues." Id. at 116. The 
court rejected this argument, stating 
that, because it was decided that the 
legislature was allowed to cap 
noneconomic damages, there was noth-
ing for the judge or the jury to decide. 
Id. The right to a jury trial arises in 
cases where the result or issue must be 
decided by either the judge or the jury. 
The court held, however, that the leg-
islature had taken the issue of 
noneconomic damages out ofthe hands 
of both the judge and jury. ld. 
The holding in Murphy settles a 
long argument in the legal, legislative 
and insurance communities. The Mary-
land Legislature enacted the 
noneconomic damages cap because it 
places as a high priority on the avail-
ability of insurance to Maryland citi-
zens. The court of appeals has clearly 
decided this one issue of whether sec-
tion 11-108 is constitutional. Yet, it is 
foreseeable that more litigation will 
follow as future litigants debate issues 
regarding whether certain damages are 
economic or noneconomic, as well as 
to which cases the noneconomic cap 
will apply. 
- Elizabeth A. Lee 
Woodson v. State: HEIGHTENED 
EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATION 
REQUIRED TO ADMIT CONFES-
SIONS WHICH TRIGGER 
DEATH SENTENCE ELIGIBIL-
ITY. 
In Woodson v. State, 325 Md. 251, 
600 A.2d 420 (1992), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland nullified 
petitioner's death sentence by revers-
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